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The Payment Vehicle Used in CV Studies 




This paper examines the effect of the payment vehicle on the valuation of an environ-
mental good with the contingent valuation method (CVM). Results from three CV studies 
comparing different payment vehicles by using split samples when valuing environmental 
encroachment caused by roads in Sweden are presented and compared to results from 
other such split-sample studies of payment vehicle effects. The results are consistent and 
show that the payment vehicle affects the valuation, but not always the way expected 
when considering incentives to behave strategically. 
 





Stated preference (SP) studies, which aim to make respondents state their preferences as 
accurately as possible, are often conducted to find the valuation of environmental goods [see 
Freeman, 2003, for a thorough description of different SP methods]. Carson and Groves 
(2007) note two conditions that must be met in order to interpret answers to SP questions with 
economic theory. First, the respondent must believe that his or her response could potentially 
influence decision making. Second, the respondent must care about the outcome of the 
decision making.
1 Such consequential questions might not be incentive compatible; i.e., the 
respondent might not have an incentive to tell the truth. Referring to the results independently 
derived by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), Carson and Groves (2007) argue that the 
response format with just one binary choice can be incentive compatible. The contingent 
valuation (CV) variant dichotomous choice (DC), where each respondent is asked about one 
specific bid for the change (first used by Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), is such a method. 
  In economics, strategic behavior is just utility-maximizing behavior (Carson, Flores, and 
Meade, 2001). A thorough discussion about strategic behavior is found in Mitchell and 
Carson (1989), where a division is made between two different kinds of bias due to strategic 
behavior. One is an incentive to exaggerate willingness to pay (WTP) when payment is not 
compulsory, and the other is an incentive to state a too low WTP when payment is individual 
and compulsory. 
  As pointed out by Carson and Groves (2007), the payment vehicle used when valuing a 
public good must be compulsory to be incentive compatible. When answering a DC CV 
question using a compulsory payment vehicle, it is only when the bid differs from the ex-
pected cost and the respondent’s WTP is between the bid and the expected cost that strategic 
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behavior would result in an inaccurate response (see Ivehammar, 2006). When the payment 
vehicle is voluntary (made as a donation), respondents have an incentive to exaggerate their 
WTP (if they want the good at all) and then free-ride when payment is collected. 
  Apart from some payment vehicles giving incentives to answer strategically, the payment 
vehicle could be important for WTP per se. People’s WTP may vary depending on their 
opinions about which payment vehicle is preferable in a specific situation or which group of 
people should pay, for example, because of political or moral views. 
  If the amount of the public good is not precisely defined, WTP should be higher with a 
compulsory payment vehicle than under a voluntary one (if there is no bias), and the more 
general the payment vehicle is, the higher WTP should be. This is because the greater the 
number of people paying for the public good, the greater will be the collective benefit. 
  The importance of the payment vehicle has been discussed since the beginning of the use 
of CVM. Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986) state that the choice of payment vehicle 
should be influenced by what payment vehicle is reasonable in a specific case, i.e., how the 
case in question would be financed if it were implemented. Mitchell and Carson (1989) pro-
pose realism and neutrality as two criteria for the choice of payment vehicle. Carson, Flores, 
and Meade (2001) emphasize that the payment vehicle used must be regarded as credible by 
the respondents in order for them to believe they might have to pay for the good in that 
manner. 
  Different payment vehicles are used in various studies. It is important to be aware of how 
the choice of each payment vehicle affects the estimated WTP—both as an aid in determining 
the proper payment vehicle in a specific planned study and when using values from existing 
studies. According to Boyle and Bergstrom (1999), payment vehicles are often assigned to 
each case without the selection of payment vehicles being proven. They caution that there 
ought to be more research about the effect of the payment vehicle used. Bjornstad and Kahn 
(1996) concur. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1989) 
proposes to compare mean WTP when using different payment vehicles. This can be accomp-
lished by using different payment vehicles in different random samples within the same study. 
  The results of split-sample studies comparing different payment vehicles, performed as 
part of three Swedish studies on environmental encroachment caused by roads and their 
traffic, are examined here. (The author of the current study was a principal investigator in 
each of these three earlier studies.) In the Swedish studies, the incentive-compatible SP 
variant DC CVM was used with the hope of minimizing biases due to incentive compatibility. 
The results pertaining to payment vehicle are also interesting when using other SP methods 
such as stated choice or multi-bounded CVM. The results are compared with findings of other 
split-sample studies on the effect of the payment vehicles used in CV investigations of 
environmental goods. The primary objective is to make a contribution to the literature 
regarding this important issue of payment vehicle effects that can be used as guidance in 
future stated preference studies of different kinds. 
 
Three Swedish Split-Sample Studies 
Comparing Different Payment Vehicles 
The three Swedish studies about environmental encroachment caused by roads and the traffic 
on them are discussed in Ivehammar (2006). Roads are meant for flexible transportation 
to  fulfill different useful purposes. Unfortunately, roads at the same time cause negative 
environmental effects. These externalities may be termed environmental encroachment. The 452   December 2009  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
motor vehicles driving on the roads create emissions and noise, and the road and its traffic 
together can cause a number of other negative effects, both when the area being encroached 
upon is a nature and/or recreational area, and when it is a built-up area where people live and 
work. A splendid view might be spoiled and the road may cause a barrier to (or in) an 
attractive area. The land where the road is placed cannot be used for anything else, and the 
area around it can suffer a lower value due to the encroachment. 
  The effect of using different payment vehicles was examined within each of the three 
studies of environmental encroachment (with the main aim to estimate the decreased envi-
ronmental value due to the encroachment) by using versions of questionnaires in split 
samples, differing only in which payment vehicles were used. The payment vehicle in the 
main version of all three studies is an increase in local taxes each year for 10 years. The form 
of raised local taxes was chosen because it is compulsory, i.e., no one who pays taxes would 
be able to avoid payment if the investment is financed in that manner. Even though these 
taxes are paid as a percentage of work income in Sweden, the bids were presented in 
monetary terms. This main payment vehicle is compared to three alternative payment 
vehicles: (a) redistribution of a given local tax revenue, (b) voluntary contributions to a fund 
for financing the investment (a donation), and (c) an obligatory earmarked charge—all per 
year for 10 years. 
  Redistribution within a particular item of expenditure (transport investments) was tested 
because this is often the way specific road investments are financed. Payment by donations 
was chosen because this payment vehicle has been fairly common in CV studies (see, e.g., 
Ready, Whitehead, and Blomquist, 1995; Berrens et al., 2002). Finally, an obligatory ear-
marked local charge was tested because it could differ from raised local taxes due to political 
views about taxes, or because an obligatory earmarked local charge would be paid equally by 
everyone while the amount of local tax is paid in proportion to income. 
 
Description of the Studies 
 
The first of the three CV studies considered the scenario of placing Centralbron (the Central 
Bridge), with six lanes and a metro bridge in the city of Stockholm, in an underground 
tunnel.
2 This scenario represents an improvement of the scenic view in this unique Swedish 
area, and was illustrated in the questionnaire with a picture of the current view and a picture 
(montage) of how it would look with the change. A total of 3,600 postal questionnaires were 
sent to a random sample of adults living in the Stockholm area. This mailing was followed by 
two reminders. The final response rate was 69%. The study pertaining to replacement of the 
Central Bridge by a tunnel in Stockholm used a main version and seven alternative versions 
of the questionnaire. The main version of the postal questionnaire was sent to 800 randomly 
chosen inhabitants of Stockholm who were 18 years of age or older. The seven alternative 
questionnaire versions were sent to samples of 400 persons each. In two versions, the 
payment vehicles of redistribution of local tax money and donations were assumed instead of 
increased local taxes.
3 
  The scenario for the second study was one in which a specific stretch of 1,200 meters of 
European Route 4 passing Huskvarna, situated between a housing area and Lake Vättern, is 
                                                 
2 The study was carried out by the author in 1997. The questionnaire was pretested using focus groups. 
3 The other five versions had a different change of the object, less information about the change, a positive instead of neutral 
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located in a tunnel.
4 The scenic view would be improved, and a photo with the road as well as 
a depiction (montage) of the stretch of the road in a tunnel were provided in the questionnaire. 
Under this scenario, the noise in the area would decrease and the accessibility to the lake 
would improve. Two different samples were developed. A random sample of 460 persons, 
i.e., one-third of the persons aged between 18 and 75 years living in the immediate area 
surrounding the stretch of the road, were mailed a questionnaire. This sample was not used in 
the analysis of payment vehicle effects. A random sample of 2,800 persons in the rest of the 
municipality also received different versions of a postal questionnaire. In two versions, 
compulsory local fees or donations were the payment vehicles instead of increased local 
taxes. Two reminders were sent as follow-ups to all questionnaire mailings. The response rate 
was 78% in the immediate surrounding area, and 65% in the rest of the municipality. 
  The third study consisted of the scenario in which a specific 1,300-meter stretch of County 
Road 100 passing Höllviken between a housing area and the sea is placed in an underground 
tunnel.
5 All 230 persons 18 to 75 years old living in the area immediately surrounding the 
stretch were sent a postal questionnaire. This sample was not used in the analysis of payment 
vehicle effects. A random sample of 1,200 persons in the rest of the town of Höllviken were 
also part of the study. Half of these individuals were sent the main questionnaire version with 
raised local taxes and the other half were sent the version with the compulsory local fee as the 
alternative payment vehicle. Two follow-up reminders were mailed. The response rate was 
70% in the immediate surrounding area and 73% in the rest of the town. 
  In all three studies, the response rate is defined as the share of the people in the sample 
answering the CV question. A tunnel scenario was used in each of the three studies, with the 
stated intent that the only benefit in the scenario is the improved environment, and the only 
cost is the payment of the project by the payment vehicle, while travel distance and travel 
time, etc., are the same. The improved environment in each scenario was described in 
narrative and with pictures. All respondents were familiar with the area and thus knew what 
the environmental encroachment meant. What they were asked to imagine was the absence of 
the environmental encroachment. 
 
Econometric Models and Tests 
 
The possible differences when using alternative payment vehicles are tested in two ways. One 
is with the help of a nonparametric model. The Turnbull estimator uses only the information 
from the responses—i.e., the share of respondents answering “no” to a certain bid—to 
estimate the distribution of willingness to pay. The lower-bound mean willingness to pay is 
estimated as: 
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where
* () .() jj wL B FF B i d E W T P  is normally distributed and the variance of the expected lower 
bound is given by:   
                                                 
4 The study was conducted by the author together with Stefan Grudemo and Jessica Sandström at the Swedish National Road and 
Transport Research Institute (VTI) in 1999. The questionnaire was pretested with a pilot study as well as through the use of focus 
groups.  
5 The study was performed by the author in collaboration with Stefan Grudemo and Jessica Sandström at VTI in 2000. The ques-
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  A detailed description of lower bound is found in Haab and McConnell (2003). The 
hypothesis that using the scenario with an alternative payment vehicle results in the same 
estimated lower-bound WTP (ELBWTP) as when using the main scenario with raised local 
taxes (i.e., ELBWTPAlternative Payment Vehicle = ELBWTPMain Payment Vehicle) is tested as follows: 
 
(3)                            -Statistic ,
LB Main LB Alternative
Main Alternative







where V denotes variance. 
  An alternative test is to pool data from two different split samples with different payment 
vehicles and analyze them with an estimated logit model [see, e.g., Louviere, Hensher, and 
Swait (2006) for a description of the logit model]. Data for the main questionnaire version 
and the alternative version are pooled, and a logit model with dummy variables for differ-
ences in intercept and/or effect of the bid between the main version and the alternative 
version is estimated as: 
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where α is a constant; Bidk is the bid to which respondent k reacts; Xik are variables describing 
the exposure of the transport infrastructure placed in a tunnel and its traffic for respondent k; 
Yjk are socioeconomic variables for respondent k; DummyVersion is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for the version with an alternative payment vehicle and 0 for the main version; and 
BidDummyVersion is a dummy variable which is the bid for the alternative version and 0 for 
the main version. If no difference due to payment vehicle exists, neither the intercept dummy 
nor the bid dummy should be significant. 
  One explanatory variable that can be expected to affect WTP in all three cases studied is 
the number of visits to the encroachment area by the respondent. Another possible explana-
tory variable in all cases is age of the respondent, since a number of Swedish valuation 
studies have shown that the valuation of environmental amenities decreases with age.
6 A 
model with a constant, the frequency of visits, age, the bid, and the two dummy variables for 
the alternative version is estimated with pooled data from the main questionnaire version and 
the alternative version.   
                                                 
6  See Ivehammar (2006). In all samples in all three studies, data were collected concerning visits and age. However, the 
respondents were not asked any questions about income in the study pertaining to the Central Bridge because it was feared such 
questions would prompt lower response rates. That study was complemented with an assessment of whether including an income 
question affected the response rate. Findings revealed no impact on the response rate. Thus, an income question was included in the 
other two studies. Ivehammar  Payment Vehicle in CV Studies of Environmental Goods Does Matter   455 
 
Table 1. Answers in the Stockholm Central Bridge Study, Different Payment Vehicles 
    
Raised Local Taxes 
  Redistribution of 
Local Tax Money 
   
Donations 
Bid (SEK)    n “Yes”  Share   n “Yes”  Share   n “Yes”  Share 
10    67 0.716    38 0.579    34 0.794 
50    73 0.493    35 0.600    34 0.588 
100    68 0.426    34 0.588    30 0.367 
300    64 0.344    32 0.531    31 0.258 
600    68 0.162    36 0.444    36 0.194 
1,000   69 0.130    36 0.500    33 0.121 
2,000   63 0.127    34 0.324    34 0.118 
5,000   66 0.045    33 0.364    37 0.081 
Per Year    E(WTP) = 480 SEK    E(WTP) = 788 SEK    E(WTP) = 569 SEK 
 
 
Tests of Payment Vehicle Effects in the Stockholm Central Bridge Study 
 
Table 1 shows the “yes” share on respective bids and the estimated lower-bound WTP (SEK
7 
per person per year for 10 years) for the scenario with the Central Bridge in a tunnel among 
people living in Stockholm, in the different split samples. 
  In the version with redistribution, the share of “yes” answers does not monotonically 
decrease with the size of the bid as in the two other versions. When calculating lower-bound 
WTP for the version with redistribution, adjustments for increases of “yes” answers at a 
higher bid are addressed by computing a pooled share for both bids using only the lower bid. 
In this case, this means the bid of 5,000 SEK will be removed and it will be assumed that no 
one has WTP higher than 2,000 SEK, even though 36.4% of the respondents answered 
“yes” to the 5,000 SEK bid. Following this strict lower-bound estimate, the intervals for the 
main version are adjusted accordingly by using 2,000 SEK as the upper border to assure 
comparability of the estimated WTP.
8 Estimating lower-bound WTP for the main version, 
using 2,000 SEK as the upper border, results in an estimated WTP of 345 SEK. The lower-
bound WTP in the version with redistribution is 788. The hypothesis that the version with 
raised local taxes results in the same estimated lower-bound WTP as the version with 
redistribution of tax money from similar areas (i.e., ELBWTP1 = ELBWTP0) is tested and yields 
a t-statistic of 3.48. The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% significance level. Table 2 
shows the estimated model with pooled data from the version using the payment vehicle of 
redistribution of local taxes and the main version with the payment vehicle of raised local 
taxes. 
  The dummy variable for the bid for the version with redistribution is significant and has a 
positive sign. A higher bid affects the probability of a “yes” answer less negatively when the 
payment vehicle is redistribution of local taxes than when the payment vehicle is raised local 
taxes. This finding corroborates the results from the nonparametric model.   
                                                 
7 SEK is the Swedish currency unit, where $1
 US is equal to approximately 7 SEK. 
8 Restricting in only one of the samples would appear biased. 456   December 2009  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 2. Logit Model, Redistribution and Raised Local Taxes, the Stockholm Central 
Bridge Study 




 ] > z 
Intercept 0.13330  0.27550  0.484  0.6284 
Bid  −0.00102 0.00018  −5.813 0.0000 
Visits  0.02830 0.01030 2.745  0.0060 
Age  −0.01060 0.00475  −2.221 0.0264 
Dummy
 Redistribution  0.30270 0.19500 1.552  0.1206 
Bid
 Dummy
 Redistribution  0.00084 0.00019 4.297  0.0000 
n = 811 
Pseudo-R
 2 = 0.12 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 68% 
    
 
Table 3. Logit Model, Donations and Raised Local Taxes, the Stockholm Central Bridge 
Study 




 ] > z 
Intercept 0.09820  0.29110  0.337  0.7358 
Bid  −0.00102 0.00018  −5.809 0.0000 
Visits  0.02960 0.01100 2.677  0.0074 
Age  −0.01000 0.00510  −1.980 0.0477 
Dummy
 Donations  −0.04170 0.21290  −0.196 0.8448 
Bid
 Dummy
 Donations  0.00027 0.00026 1.052  0.2930 
n = 801 
Pseudo-R
 2 = 0.13 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 72% 
    
 
  Using the payment vehicle of donations to a fund, the calculated mean lower-bound WTP 
is 569 SEK per person per year for 10 years. The hypothesis that the version with donations 
to a fund results in the same estimated lower-bound WTP as the version with raised local 
taxes (i.e., ELBWTP1 = ELBWTP0) is tested and yields a t-statistic of 0.51. The hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. Table 3 shows the estimated model with 
pooled data to test if any of the dummy variables are significant when pooling data for the 
version with the payment vehicle of donations to a fund and the main version with the pay-
ment vehicle of raised local taxes in the Stockholm Central Bridge study. 
  Neither of the two dummy variables is significant. According to the results of the tests of 
the responses in the study about the Central Bridge, the hypothesis of no significant differ-
ence between using raised local taxes and using donations to a fund as a payment vehicle 
cannot be rejected. 
 
Tests of Payment Vehicle Effects in the Huskvarna Study 
A version with donations to a fund was also tested in the case involving placing a specific 
stretch of European Route 4 passing Huskvarna in a tunnel, as well as the compulsory fee pay- 
ment vehicle. Table 4 reports the share of “yes” answers on respective bids and lower-bound Ivehammar  Payment Vehicle in CV Studies of Environmental Goods Does Matter   457 
 
Table 4. Answers in the Huskvarna Study, Different Payment Vehicles 
   Raised Local Taxes    Compulsory Fee    Donations 
Bid (SEK)    n “Yes”  Share   n “Yes”  Share   n “Yes”  Share 
10    84 0.529    45 0.600    45 0.533 
25    83 0.518    43 0.488    39 0.513 
70    78 0.436    42 0.476    38 0.368 
120    86 0.430    43 0.326    44 0.182 
300    84 0.298    46 0.261    51 0.176 
600    84 0.202    48 0.250    43 0.186 
1,200   88 0.159    43 0.163    48 0.021 
Per Year    E(WTP) = 264 SEK     E(WTP) = 271 SEK    E(WTP) = 90 SEK  
 
Table 5. Logit Model, Voluntary Contributions and Raised Local Taxes, Rest of Huskvarna 




 ] > z 
Intercept 0.64180  0.24610  2.607  0.0091 
Bid  −0.00163 0.00028  −5.881 0.0000 
Visits  0.03570 0.01130 3.166  0.0015 
Age  −0.01890 0.00490  −3.818 0.0001 
Dummy
 Donations  −0.11260 0.20790  −0.541 0.5882 
Bid
 Dummy
 Donations  −0.00145 0.00068  −2.127 0.0334 
n = 808 
Pseudo-R
 2 = 0.11 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 67% 
    
 
 
WTP for the scenario in Huskvarna for those living in the rest of the municipality of 
Jönköping in the different split samples with alternative payment vehicles. 
  The calculated mean lower-bound WTP to have the stretch of road in a tunnel is 264 SEK 
per person per year for 10 years compared to 90 SEK per person per year for 10 years when 
the payment vehicle is donations. The hypothesis that the version with donations to a fund 
results in the same estimated lower-bound WTP as the version with raised taxes (i.e., 
ELBWTP1 = ELBWTP0) is tested and yields a t-statistic of 4.97. Thus, the hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level. Table 5 shows the parameters in a logit model with 
pooled data from the version with the donations payment vehicle and the main version with 
the payment vehicle of raised local taxes for the rest of Jönköping municipality. 
  The dummy variable for the bid for the version with donations is significant. A higher bid 
negatively affects the probability of a “yes” answer more when donations are used than when 
raised local taxes is the payment vehicle. This finding is in agreement with the nonparametric 
result. The a priori hypothesis considering incentives to behave strategically is instead that 
individuals making donations should give higher payments because payment is not compul-
sory and, when collected, respondents can avoid paying. Since the public good was exactly 
defined, this could not be the explanation for our finding (refer to discussion in the intro-
duction section). This topic is further discussed below.   458   December 2009  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 6. Logit Model, Compulsory Fee and Raised Local Taxes, Rest of Huskvarna 




 ] > z 
Intercept 0.58270  0.24390  2.389  0.0169 
Bid  −0.00163 0.00028  −5.887 0.0000 
Visits  0.03740 0.01110 3.376  0.0007 
Age  −0.01760 0.00490  −3.603 0.0003 
Dummy
 Compulsory




 Fee  −0.00004 0.00047  −0.079 0.9370 
n = 879 
Pseudo-R
 2 = 0.08 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 65% 
    
 
Table 7. Answers in the Höllviken Study, Different Payment Vehicles 
   Raised Local Taxes    Compulsory Fee 
Bid (SEK)    n “Yes”  Share    n “Yes”  Share 
20   86 0.500    89  0.449 
100   91  0.308    80 0.263 
300   81  0.235    92 0.261 
500   88  0.227    84 0.107 
1,500   95  0.063    88  0.091 
Per Year    E(WTP) = 190 SEK       E(WTP) = 195 SEK    
 
  The calculated mean lower-bound WTP is 271 SEK when using a compulsory fee as the 
payment vehicle. The hypothesis that the version with a compulsory fee to a fund results in 
the same estimated lower-bound WTP as the version with raised taxes (i.e., ELBWTP1 = 
ELBWTP0) is tested, resulting in a t-statistic of 0.19. Hence, the hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at the 10% significance level. Table 6 gives the coefficients in the estimated logit model with 
pooled data from the two versions. The model does not have any significant dummy variable. 
This finding is consistent with the nonparametric test. 
 
Tests of Payment Vehicle Effects in the Höllviken Study 
A version with a compulsory fee to a fund was also used in the study about placing a specific 
stretch of County Road 100 in Höllviken in a tunnel. Table 7 reports the share of “yes” 
answers on respective bids and distribution-free estimation of WTP for the scenario in 
Höllviken for those living in the rest of the town
9 when using raised local taxes compared to 
when using a compulsory fee as the payment vehicle. 
  The calculated lower-bound mean WTP per person per year for 10 years to place the 
stretch of road in a tunnel is 190 SEK when raised local taxes is the payment vehicle and 195 
SEK when a compulsory fee is the payment vehicle. The hypothesis that the version with a 
                                                 
9 A sample comprised of the people living in the immediate surrounding area to the stretch of the road was developed as well as 
a larger sample from the whole town of Höllviken. Ivehammar  Payment Vehicle in CV Studies of Environmental Goods Does Matter   459 
 
Table 8. Logit Model, Compulsory Fee and Raised Local Taxes, Rest of Höllviken 




 ] > z 
Intercept 1.8464  0.4407  4.190  0.0000 
Bid  −0.0018 0.0003  −5.479 0.0000 
Visits  0.0323 0.0127  2.537  0.0112 
Age  −0.0463 0.0083  −5.580 0.0000 
Dummy
 Compulsory




 Fee  0.0003 0.0005  0.636  0.5248 
n = 844 
Pseudo-R
 2 = 0.11 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 76% 
   
 
       
      Table 9. Comparison Between WTP with Raised Local Taxes and an  
       
      Alternative Payment Vehicle 
Payment Vehicle and Study  Result 
Redistribution of Local Taxes:   
   ■
  The Central Bridge in Stockholm  WTP higher 
Donations to a Fund:   
   ■
  The Central Bridge in Stockholm 
   ■
  Route E4 passing Huskvarna 
No difference 
WTP lower 
Obligatory Earmarked Local Fee:   
   ■
  Route E4 passing Huskvarna 
   ■





compulsory fee to a fund results in the same estimated lower-bound WTP as the version with 
raised taxes (i.e., ELBWTP1 = ELBWTP0) is tested and results in a t-statistic of 0.11. As with 
the two previous studies, the hypothesis that a compulsory fee to a fund and raised local taxes 
results in the same estimated lower-bound WTP cannot be rejected at the 10% significance 
level here. Table 8 shows the parameters in a pooled parametric model for raised local taxes 
and a compulsory fee to a fund for the respondents in the rest of the town of Höllviken. 
Neither the bid nor the intercept dummy is significant, in agreement with the nonparametric 
analysis. 
 
Summary of Results from the Tests of Payment Vehicle Effects 
in the Three Studies 
 
Table 9 summarizes the results of all tests of payment vehicle effects in the three studies, as to 
whether the alternative payment vehicles significantly differ from raised local taxes. 
  The comparison between raised local taxes and donations gave different results in the two 
different studies where they were compared. In one of the studies, donations to a fund did 
not result in any significant difference, but in the other, WTP by donations was significantly 
lower than WTP by raised local taxes.   460   December 2009  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
  Redistribution of local tax money resulted in higher WTP than raised local taxes in the 
study concerning the Central Bridge in Stockholm. One possible explanation is that redistri-
bution of tax money is not fully interpreted as a cost by respondents, as suggested by the 
nonmonotonicity for redistribution between “yes” shares on different bids. Respondents 
might believe that the reallocation would be made from what they think is least valuable. To 
describe in detail from what source the redistribution would come, however, is only an 
alternative when the aim is to make a decision in a particular case knowing exactly what that 
source would be, since WTP depends on how the respondents value this usage. It would be 
interesting to study this payment vehicle with some SP method in connection to a real case. 
An obligatory earmarked fee gave no statistically significant different results in either of the 
two comparisons in the Huskvarna and the Höllviken studies. 
 
Comparison with Results from Other Studies 
 
There have been other split-sample studies comparing donations with raised taxes, and their 
results are consistent with our findings. Jakobsson and Dragun (1996) compared increased 
annual state taxes with annual donations to a fund when valuing the Leadbeater’s possum in a 
DC CV study. Approximately 600 questionnaires with each payment vehicle were sent, 
yielding a response rate of 32%. WTP was significantly higher when the payment vehicle was 
increased taxes compared to when it was donations. Bateman et al. (1995) tested unspecified 
donations, donations to a specific fund, and direct taxation as payment vehicles in a pilot 
study preceding a study about WTP for a project to protect the Norfolk Broads wetland 
against flooding from the North Sea. The pilot study used open-ended CVM in interviews 
with 433 persons in a three-split sample. A large difference was observed among zero WTP 
bids. With unspecified donations, 46% of respondents gave a zero bid; with donations to a 
fund, 23% gave zero bids; but only 12% gave zero bids with the tax payment vehicle. Champ 
et al. (2002) compared donations to a fund, the same with a provision point with money-back 
guarantee, and a one-time tax increase for Boulder County, Colorado, residents when valuing 
open space land in a CV study. Questionnaires were mailed to 4,200 Boulder County 
residents—i.e., 1,400 questionnaires were mailed per payment vehicle. A response rate of 
49% was achieved. WTP was significantly higher with raised taxes as the payment vehicle 
compared to the other two payment vehicles. Milon (1989) compared WTP by voluntary 
contributions and WTP by a special one-year charge on fuel for boaters to be applied to a 
fund to build an artificial reef. The sample consisted of 3,600 boat owners, and the response 
rate was 45%. Milon found no significant difference in WTP. 
  A problem with donations is that respondents cannot be forced to pay, and consequently 
there is no cost for their answer in the study. This means they have an incentive to exaggerate 
their WTP (if they want the good at all), because they can then free-ride when donations are 
actually collected. This choice could be assumed to potentially result in too high a valuation. 
Moreover, there are eventual effects due to personal views about payment vehicles and the 
fact that real donations instead give incentives to free-ride. One possible explanation for the 
result in the studies of payment vehicle effects associated with donations is a finding reported 
by Champ and Bishop (2001) in the pre-test focus groups prior to a mail survey where 
donations was used as the payment vehicle. One reason participants gave for answering “no” 
was their belief that all customers should jointly share the expense. Another possible 
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  Wiser (2007) presents the results from a study comparing a voluntary with a collective 
payment vehicle and a private with a government provision. The DC CV study examined 
WTP in dollars per month for three years for renewable energy. A total of 4,056 ques-
tionnaires were mailed, generating a response rate of 45%. The sample was split into four 
segments, which differed according to collective/voluntary payment and private/government 
provision. The collective payment was in the form of a compulsory increase in the electricity 
bill for everyone, and the voluntary payment was in the form of a voluntary increase in the 
electricity bill. The collected funds would be spent either by the government or by electricity 
suppliers on renewable energy projects. WTP was higher with collective payment than with 
voluntary payment in both split samples, but the difference was significant only when 
provision was private. 
  Redistribution of tax money and raised taxes has also been compared by others, yielding 
results consistent with ours. Bergstrom, Boyle, and Yabe (2004) compared redistribution of 
tax money and raised taxes when valuing a groundwater protection program. The valuation 
question was asked in a form which elicited a “yes” or “no” response to a referendum on the 
issue. The payment vehicle was either a special tax in dollars per year for 10 years or reallo-
cation of tax money from other public services. Roads and bridges, schools, parks, police 
protection, and health care were given as examples of public services. A total of 787 
households in Georgia and 920 households in Maine were mailed questionnaires  with a 
dichotomous choice or an open-ended question, where special tax or tax reallocation was the 
payment vehicle. The response rate was 53%. WTP was significantly higher when using tax 
reallocation than when using a special tax. The differences were huge. With DC, estimated 
WTP was 18 times higher when using tax reallocation as the payment vehicle than when 
using a special tax. 
  An increase in taxes was compared with a fee by Morrison, Blamey, and Bennett (2000). 
Their study estimated WTP for constructing a pipe to transport drained groundwater away 
from a unique wetland in Australia using either a “one-time levy” on the water bill or on 
income tax. Questionnaires were mailed to a split sample of 1,648 households in New South 
Wales and South Australia and generated a response rate of 48%. WTP using the two 
different payment vehicles was not significantly different, consistent with the results in our 
studies. 
  Some other payment vehicles have also been compared with split-sample studies. In a 
couple of studies conducted at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, as 
referenced by Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986), a general sales tax as a payment 
vehicle resulted in higher valuation than using a special fee. Kontoleon, Yabe, and Darby 
(2005) report the results from a study assessing the valuation of labeling whether food is 
genetically modified, using two different payment vehicles. Redistribution of tax money from 
other public services was compared with increased food prices as the payment vehicle. 
Questionnaires were sent to 2,000 UK households, resulting in 533 usable responses. It was 
not possible to reject the hypothesis of no difference in estimated WTP using the two 
different payment vehicles. 
  Campos, Caparrós, and Oviedo (2007) value a visit for one day in two different protected 
Spanish forests using two different payment vehicles. An entrance fee is compared with 
increased expenditures for visiting the forest in the form of increased gasoline price. Visitors 
were interviewed. In one application the different payment vehicles were used on different 
occasions (and only half as many respondents were asked about the entrance fee), while in the 
other the respondents randomly received either of the payment vehicles. Approximately 500 462   December 2009  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
interviews per variant (250 in one) were carried out. One of the applications asked about three 
different amounts, and the other used one DC question followed by an open-ended valuation 
question. Estimated WTP was significantly higher (2–3 times higher) when using increased 
gasoline price than when using the entrance fee as the payment vehicle in both studies, even 




When a payment vehicle is compulsory, it is nearly impossible to avoid payment. All of the 
payment vehicles used in the split samples are more or less compulsory except for donations. 
With some payment vehicles, all members have to pay, while with others, only the users of 
the good pay. When a charge or tax is connected to buying or using specific goods, it is 
possible to escape payment by no longer using the goods, while a general obligatory tax 
increase, obligatory general charge, or redistribution within the budget expenses cannot be 
avoided. The effect of increasing the price of goods depends on the price elasticity of 
demand, which depends on the substitution possibilities. The degree to which a fee on the 
valued good is compulsory depends on the price elasticity of the good. 
  There are some general results that are consistent across our studies as well as other 
investigations. One is that redistribution of already collected tax money can give higher WTP 
than raised taxes or a new fee, while donations as a vehicle payment results in lower (or the 
same) WTP. General payment vehicles seem to result in higher WTP per person than pay-
ment vehicles where only the users of the good pay, although the extent of the good received 
is defined. 
  It is important to carefully consider which payment vehicle should be used in a planned 
study, and to consider the payment vehicle when using values from earlier studies, since it has 
been clearly proven that the payment vehicle does matter. Something important to point out is 
that it is not evident that what is assumed from incentives to behave strategically will be 
found in empirical studies (as for donations). 
  More research is needed about the effect of the payment vehicle used.
10 Although it has 
been pointed out in several earlier studies using stated preference applications that the 
payment vehicle should be studied, to date this topic has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature. 
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